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Large Supports are required for Well-Supported Nash Equilibria
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Sergey Norin4, Adrian Vetta5, and Hehui Wu6
Abstract
We prove that for any constant k and any ǫ < 1, there exist bimatrix win-lose games for which
every ǫ-WSNE requires supports of cardinality greater than k. To do this, we provide a graph-
theoretic characterization of win-lose games that possess ǫ-WSNE with constant cardinality
supports. We then apply a result in additive number theory of Haight [8] to construct win-lose
games that do not satisfy the requirements of the characterization. These constructions disprove
graph theoretic conjectures of Daskalakis, Mehta and Papadimitriou [7] and Myers [13].
1 Introduction
A Nash equilibrium of a bimatrix game (A,B) is a pair of strategies that are mutual best-responses.
Nash equilibria always exist in a finite game [14], but finding one is hard, unless PPAD ⊆ P [5].
This has lead to the study of relaxations of the equilbrium concept. A notable example is an
ǫ-approximate Nash equilibrium (ǫ-NE). Here, every player must receive an expected payoff within
ǫ of their best response payoff. Thus ǫ-NE are numerical relaxations of Nash Equilibria. Counter-
intuitively, however, given that Nash’s existence result is via a fixed point theorem, Nash equilibria
are intrinsically combinatorial objects. In particular, the crux of the equilibrium problem is to find
the supports of the equilibrium. In particular, at an equilibrium, the supports of both strategies
consist only of best responses. This induces a combinatorial relaxation called an ǫ-well supported
approximate Nash equilibrium (ǫ-WSNE). Now the content of the supports are restricted, but less
stringently than in an exact Nash equilibrium. Specifically, both players can only place positive
probability on strategies that have payoff within ǫ of a pure best response.
Observe that in an ǫ-NE, no restriction is placed on the supports of the strategies. Consequently,
a player might place probability on a strategy that is arbitrarily far from being a best response! This
practical deficiency is forbidden under ǫ-WSNE. Moreover, the inherent combinatorial structure of
ǫ-WSNE has been extremely useful in examining the hardness of finding Nash equilibria. Indeed,
Daskalakis, Goldberg and Papadimitriou [6] introduced ǫ-WSNE in proving the PPAD-completeness
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of finding a Nash equilibrium in multiplayer games. They were subsequently used as the notion
of approximate equilibrium by Chen, Deng and Teng [5] when examining the hardness of bimatrix
games.
This paper studies the (non)-existence of ǫ-WSNE with small supports. Without loss of gener-
ality, we may assume that all payoffs in (A,B) are in [0, 1]. Interestingly, for ǫ-NE, there is then
a simple 12 -NE with supports of cardinality at most two [7]. Take a row r. Let column c be a
best response to r, and let r′ be a best response to c. Suppose the row player places probability
1
2 on r and r
′, and the column player plays column c as a pure strategy. It is easy to verify that
this is a 12 -NE. On the other hand, Altho¨fer [1] showed the existence of zero-sum games for which
every ǫ-NE, with ǫ < 14 , requires supports of cardinality at least log n. This result is almost tight;
a probabilistic argument shows the existence of ǫ-NE with supports of cardinality O( log n
ǫ2
), for any
ǫ > 0; see Lipton et al. [11].
For the case of well-supported equilibria, Anbalagan et al. [2] recently showed the existence
of win-lose games for which every ǫ-WSNE, with ǫ < 23 , require supports of cardinality at least
3
√
log n. They also proved, in contrast to ǫ-NE, that with supports of cardinality at most two, it is
not possible to guarantee the existence of an ǫ-WSNE, for any ǫ < 1.
The outstanding open problem in the area is whether there is a constant k and an ǫ < 1 such
that, for any bimatrix game, there is a ǫ-WSNE with supports of cardinality at most k. In the
paper we prove this is not the case. This result illustrates a fundamental structural distinction
between ǫ-WSNE and ǫ-NE. This structural distinction also has practical implications with regards
to behavioural models and popular equilibria search algorithms that focus upon small supports.
The key to our result is the disproof of graph theoretic conjectures of Daskalakis, Mehta and
Papadimitriou [7] and Myers [13] via an old result in additive number theory of Haight [8].
2 WSNE and a Graph Theoretic Conjecture
A bimatrix game is a 2-player game with m × n payoff matrices A and B. We consider normal
form games with entries in the payoff matrices in [0, 1]. A pair of mixed strategies {p, q} forms an
ǫ-well supported Nash equilibrium (ǫ-WSNE) if every pure strategy in the support of p (resp. q) is
an ǫ-approximate best response to q (resp p). Thus {p, q} forms an ǫ-WSNE if and only if:
∀i : pi > 0 ⇒ eiTAq ≥ ejTAq − ǫ ∀j = 1, ..,m
and
∀i : qi > 0 ⇒ pTBei ≥ pTBej − ǫ ∀j = 1, .., n
To analyse well-supported equilibria in a win-lose game (A,B), Daskalakis et al. [7] applied a
decorrelation transformation to obtain a pair of decorrelated matrices (A∗, B∗). The exact details
of this decorrelation transformation are not important here. What is pertinent, however, is that the
2
n× n square 0− 1 matrix A∗ induces a directed, possibly non-bipartite, graph H = (V,E). There
are n vertices in V , and there is an arc ij ∈ E if an only if A∗ij = 1. Moreover, Daskalakis et al.
proved that the original win-lose game has a (1− 1
k
)-WSNE with supports of cardinality at most k
if H contains either a directed cycle of length k or a set of k undominated1 vertices. Furthermore,
they conjectured that every directed graph contains either a small cycle or a small undominated
set.
Conjecture 2.1. [7] There are integers k and l such that every digraph either has a cycle of length
at most k or an undominated set of l vertices.
Indeed, they believed the conjecture was true for k = l = 3 and, consequently, that every
bimatrix win-lose game has a 23 -WSNE with supports of cardinality at most three. Interestingly,
motivated by the classical Caccetta-Haggkvist conjecture [3] in extremal graph theory, a similar
conjecture was made previously by Myers [13].
Conjecture 2.2. [13] There is an integer k such that every digraph either has a cycle of length at
most k or an undominated set of two vertices.
Myers conjectured that this was true even for k = 3, but Charbit [4] proved this special case to
be false.
We say that D is a (k, l)-digraph if every directed cycle in D has length at least k, and every
S ⊆ V (D) of cardinality at most l is dominated. In Section 4, we will prove that there exists a
finite (k, l)-digraph for every pair of positive integers k and l. This will imply that Conjectures 2.1
and 2.2 are false.
3 A Characterization for Games with Small Support ǫ-WSNE.
In this section, we show Daskalakis et al.’s sufficiency condition extends to a characterization of
when a win-lose game has ǫ-WSNE with constant supports. To do this, rather than non-bipartite
graphs, it is more natural for bimatrix games to work with bipartite graphs. In particular, any
win-lose game (A,B) has a simple representation as a bipartite directed graph G = (R ∪ C,E).
To see this, let G contain a vertex for each row and a vertex for each column. There exists an arc
(ri, cj) ∈ E if and only if Aij = 1. So ri is the best response for the row player against the strategy
cj of the column player. Similarly, there exists an arc (cj , ri) ∈ E if and only if Bij = 1. So, cj is a
best response for the column player against the strategy ri of the row player.
We will now show that a win-lose game has a (1− 1
k
)-WSNE with supports of cardinality at most
k if and only if the corresponding directed bipartite graph has either a small cycle or a small set
of undominated vertices. Thus we obtain a characterization of win-lose games that have ǫ-WSNE
with small cardinality supports.
1A set S is undominated if there is no vertex v that has an arc to every vertex in S.
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It what follows, we will only consider undominated sets that are contained either in R or in C
Lemma 3.1. Let G be a win-lose game with minimum out-degree at least one. If G contains
an undominated set of cardinality k then there is a (1 − 1
k
)-WSNE with supports of cardinality at
most k.
Proof. Without loss of generality, let U = {r1, ..., rk} be the undominated set. Let the row player
play a uniform strategy p on these k rows. Since U is undominated, any column has expected
payoff at most 1− 1
k
against p. Therefore every column cj is a (1 − 1k )-approximate best response
against p.
By assumption, each row vertex ri has out-degree at least one. Let cf(i) be an out-neighbour
of ri (possibly f(i) = f(j) for j 6= i). Now let the column player play a uniform strategy q on
{cf(i)}ki=1. Because q has support cardinality at most k, each pure strategy ri ∈ U has an expected
payoff at least 1
k
against q. Thus, these ri’s are all (1− 1k )-approximate best responses for the row
player against q. So {p, q} is a (1− 1
k
)-WSNE with supports of cardinality at most k.
Lemma 3.2. If G contains a cycle of length 2k then there is a (1 − 1
k
)-WSNE with supports of
cardinality k.
Proof. Let W be a cycle of length 2k in G. Since G is bipartite, k of the vertices in the cycle are
row vertices and k are column vertices. Let p be the uniform strategy on the rows in W and let q
be the uniform strategy on the columns in W . We claim that p and q form a (1 − 1
k
)-WSNE. To
prove this, consider the subgraph F induced by the vertices ofW . Every vertex in F has out-degree
(and in-degree) at least one since W ⊆ F . So, every pure strategy in p, gives the row player an
expected payoff of at least 1
k
against q. Thus, every pure strategy in p is a (1 − 1
k
)-best response
for the row player against q. Similarly, every pure strategy in q is a (1 − 1
k
)-best response for the
column player against p.
Lemma 3.1 and Lemma 3.2 immediately give the following corollary.
Corollary 3.3. Let G be a win-lose game with minimum out-degree at least one. If G contains a
cycle of length 2k or an undominated set of cardinality k then then the win-lose game has (1− 1
k
)-
WSNE with supports of cardinality at most k.
Importantly, the converse also holds.
Lemma 3.4. Let G be a win-lose game with minimum out-degree at least one. If there is an ǫ-
WSNE (for any ǫ < 1) with supports of cardinality at most k then G either contains an undominated
set of cardinality k or contains a cycle of length at most 2k.
Proof. Take a win-lose game G = (R∪C,E) and let p and q be an ǫ-WSNE. Suppose the supports
of p and q, namely P ⊆ R and Q ⊆ C, have cardinality at most k.
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We may assume that every set of cardinality every set of k (on the same side of the bipartition)
is dominated; otherwise we are already done. In particular, both P and Q are dominated. Conse-
quently, the row player has a best response with expected payoff 1 against q. Similarly, the column
player has a best response with expected payoff 1 against p. Thus, for the ǫ-WSNE {p, q}, we have:
∀i : pi > 0 ⇒ eiTRq ≥ 1− ǫ > 0
∀j : qj > 0 ⇒ pTCej ≥ 1− ǫ > 0
Here the strict inequalities follow because ǫ < 1. Therefore, in the subgraph F induced by P ∪Q,
every vertex has an out-degree at least one. But then F contains a cycle W . Since H contains at
most 2k vertices, the cycle W has length at most 2k.
Corollary 3.3 and Lemma 3.4 then give the following characterization for win-lose games with
ǫ-WSNE with small cardinality supports
Theorem 3.5. Let G be a win-lose game with minimum out-degree at least one. Take any constant
k and any ǫ such that 1− 1
k
≤ ǫ < 1. The game contains an ǫ-WSNE with supports of cardinality
at most k if and only if G contains an undominated set of cardinality k or a cycle of length at most
2k.
4 Digraphs of Large Girth with every Small Subset Dominated
In this section, we will first prove that there exists a finite (k, l)-digraph for every pair of positive
integers k and l and, hence, disprove Conjecture 2.1. We then adapt the resulting counterexamples
in order to apply Theorem 3.5 and deduce that, for any constant k and any ǫ < 1, there exist
bimatrix win-lose games for which every ǫ-WSNE require supports of cardinality greater than k.
The main tool we require is a result of Haight [8] from additive number theory. We will require
the following notation. Let Γ be an additive group. Then, for X ⊆ Γ, denote
X −X = {x1 − x2 | x1, x2 ∈ X}, and
(k)X = {x1 + x2 + . . . + xk | xi ∈ X for 1 ≤ i ≤ k}.
Finally, let Zq = {0, 1, . . . , q − 1} denote the additive group of Z/qZ, the integers modulo q.
Haight [8] proved:
Theorem 4.1. [8] For all positive integers k and l, there exists a positive integer qˆ = qˆ(k, l) and
a set X ⊆ Zqˆ, such that X −X = Zqˆ, but (k)X omits l consecutive residues.
To construct the finite (k, l)-digraph we will use the following corollary.
Corollary 4.2. For every positive integer k, there exists a positive integer q = q(k) and a set
Y ⊆ Zq, such that Y − Y = Zq, but 0 6∈ (k)Y .
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Proof. Let l = k and apply Theorem 4.1 with q = q(k) = qˆ(k, k). Thus, we obtain a set X ⊆ Zq
with the properties that: (i) X −X = Zq, and (ii) (k)X omits k consecutive residues. But these
k consecutive residues must contain ky for some y ∈ Zq. Thus, there exists y ∈ Zq such that
ky 6∈ (k)X.
Now, define Y := X − y. Then Y − Y = X −X = Zq. Furthermore, ky 6∈ (k)(Y + y). This
implies that 0 6∈ (k)Y , as desired.
We now construct a counter-example to Conjecture 2.2 of Myers. We will then show how the
construction can be extend to disprove Conjecture 2.1.
Theorem 4.3. For any positive integer κ, there exists a (κ, 2)-digraph D.
Proof. Set k = (κ − 1)! and apply Corollary 4.2. Thus we find Y ⊆ Zq, with q = q(k) where
Y − Y = Zq, and 0 6∈ (k)Y . From Y , we create a directed graph D as follows. Let the vertex set
be V (D) = Zq. Let the arc set be E(D) = {z1z2 | z1 − z2 ∈ Y }.
Now take any pair z1, z2 ∈ Zq. Because Y − Y = Zq, there exist y1, y2 ∈ Y such that z1 − z2 =
y1 − y2. We now claim that the vertex pair z1, z2 ∈ V (D) is dominated. To see this consider the
vertex x ∈ V (D) where x = z1 + y2 = z2 + y1. Then xz1 is an arc in E(D) because x − z1 =
(z1+ y2)− z1 = y2 ∈ Y . On the other hand x = z2+ y1 and so x− z2 = y1 ∈ Y . Consequently, xz2
is also in E(D). Hence, every subset of V (D) of cardinality at most 2 is dominated.
It remains to prove that D contains no directed cycle of length less than κ. So, assume there
is a cycle C with ordered vertices z1, z2, . . . , zs, where s < κ. As zizi+1 is an arc we have that
zi − zi+1 = yi where yi ∈ Y , for 1 ≤ i ≤ s (here we assume zs+1 = z1). Summing around the cycle
we have that y1 + y2 + · · · + ys = 0 modulo q. This implies that 0 ∈ (s)Y as y1, y2, . . . , ys ∈ Y .
Consequently, 0 ∈ (ts)Y for any positive integer t. In particular, 0 ∈ (k)Y = ((κ − 1)!)Y , as
s ≤ κ− 1. This contradicts the choice of Y and, so, D is a (κ, 2)-digraph, as desired.
Theorem 4.4. For every pair of positive integers k and l, there exists a finite (k, l)-digraph.
Proof. Without loss of generality, assume l ≥ 2. By Theorem 4.3, there exists a ((k−1)(l−1)+1, 2)-
digraph D′. We claim that the (l − 1)-st power of D′ is a (k, l)-digraph. More precisely, let the
digraph D be defined by V (D) = V (D′) and vw ∈ E(D) if and only if there exists a directed walk
from v to w in D′ using at most (l − 1) edges.
Suppose D has a cycle of length at most k − 1. This corresponds to a closed directed walk of
length a most (k − 1)(l − 1) in D′. This is a contradiction as D′ has no cycles of length shorter
than (k − 1)(l − 1) + 1. Therefore, the shortest directed cycle in D has length at least k.
It remains to prove that every S ⊆ V (D) with |S| = l is dominated. So take S = {v1, v2, . . . , vl}.
Recall that every pair of vertices in V (D′) = V (D) is dominated in D′. So there is a vertex z1
dominating v1 and v2 in D
′. Now let zi+1 be a vertex dominating zi and vi+2 for 1 ≤ i ≤ l − 2.
By construction, there is a directed walk in D′ from zl−1 to vi of length at most l − 1, for every
1 ≤ i ≤ l. Thus zl−1vi ∈ E(D), and S is dominated in D, as desired.
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Observe that these constructions are non-bipartite. To exploit the characterization of Theo-
rem 3.5 (and therefore conclude that there are games with no ǫ-WSNE with small supports), we
desire bipartite constructions. These we can create using a simple mapping from non-bipartite to
bipartite graphs. Given a non-bipartite graph G = (V,E), we build a win-lose game, that is, a
bipartite directed graph G′ = (R ∪ C,E′) as follows. We set R = C = V . Thus, for each vi ∈ V
we have a row vertex ri ∈ R and a column vertex ci ∈ C. Next, for each arc a = (vi, vj) in G, we
create two arcs (ri, cj) and (ci, rj) in G
′. Finally, for each vi ∈ V we add an arc (ri, ci).
Now let’s understand what this mapping does to cycles and undominated sets. First, suppose
G contains a cycle of length k. Then observe that G′ contains a cycle of length k if k is even and
of length k + 1 if k is odd. On the other hand, suppose the minimum length cycle in G′ is k + 1.
This cycle will contain at most one pair of vertices type {ri, ci}, and if it contains such a pair then
these vertices are consecutive on the cycle. (Otherwise we can find a shorter cycle in G′.) Thus, G
contains a cycle of length k or k + 1.
Second, consider an undominated set S ⊆ V of size ℓ in G. Then S ⊆ R is undominated in G′.
(Note S ⊆ C may be dominated because we added arcs of the form (ri, ci) to G′). On the other
hand if S is undominated in G′ (either in R or C) then S is also undominated in G.
Applying this mapping to a non-bipartite (2k + 1, k)-digraph produces a bipartite digraph for
which every set of k vertices (on the same side of the bipartition) is dominated but that has no
cycle of length at most 2k. Thus, by Theorem 3.5, the corresponding game has no ǫ-WSNE, for
any ǫ < 1, with supports of cardinality at most k.
Theorem 4.5. For any constant k and any ǫ < 1, there exist bimatrix win-lose games for which
every ǫ-WSNE requires supports of cardinality greater than k.
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